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Abstract 
The headwinds facing the euro area are many and substantial: there is no pretence of denial. While most attention is 
correctly devoted to the size of rescue packages for some countries and the terms of crisis management and resolution 
mechanisms, we argue that these challenges must also be met from within the euro area. We are aided by a simple 
framework illustrating how the benefits the euro can generate depend on the degree of openness, flexibility and income 
correlation among euro area countries. Sharing the euro has steadily transformed euro area economies that are now deeply 
interconnected. This is generating largely benign effects that represent the intrinsic value of the euro area: it is a shared 
asset. Yet, such integration has provided the ground for the transmission of the sovereign crisis: through financial 
exposure, trade linkages and cross-country asset ownership.  
The solution, however, lies not in severing these ties, but rather in turning the governance around. Some aspects stand out. 
While we had long understood the welfare costs of deferring structural reforms for too long, we now know that in a 
monetary union this may pose substantial risks to fiscal but also financial stability. Moreover, euro area countries need to 
more closely interpret domestic price developments, relative costs of production and unit labour costs, export market 
shares and productivity developments. This is reminiscent of the pegging of the nominal exchange rate of the past: it 
entails pegging real exchange rates. We note that the governance of the euro area has already turned around: yet this will 
take some time to ascertain. However, at heart, there is a need for more clearly explaining what EMU can and cannot do, 
and conveying the rationale for its unique governance. As the features of a novel and broadly accepted governance of 
EMU emerge, uncertainties will be gradually reduced. This will support the growth that is indispensable to heal the legacy 
of the crisis and complete the transformation of the euro area. The euro can provide an outside shield and foster internal 
stability to support this process while facing several global challenges that are ‘too big to handle’ for any euro area 
country alone. 
Introduction 
Various events have marked the 10
th anniversary of 
the euro, which was launched in January 1999. There 
were many reasons to celebrate. The new monetary 
policy framework secured price stability. Economic 
and financial integration made important strides. No 
‘fortress Europe’ was erected. Unemployment 
declined and labour market participation rose. Yet not 
all went as desired. There were failings in the 
economic governance of the euro area. Consequently, 
various fault lines were allowed to build up over time: 
namely, weak public finances in a group of countries, 
persistent imbalances in another overlapping group 
and slow productivity growth in some others. The 
global financial crisis, whose epicentre seemed 
initially far away, has exposed and exacerbated these 
fault lines. The challenge is now acute in Greece and 
Ireland, but these are not the only problems we face. 
A wave of scepticism has ensued. Some 
commentators are now even contemplating a wave of 
disorderly defaults and failures of financial 2 | Francesco Paolo Mongelli 
institutions. Is there a framework to illustrate, at least 
in part, this turn of events? Looking ahead, how can 
we reduce such systemic risks?  
Before answering these questions, we need to take a 
few steps back in time and ‘deconstruct’ the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), at the core of 
which lies the euro area. The euro area has been 
shaped by three main forces over several decades 
(Figure 1). The first is ‘political integration’. While 
early on, political vision was needed to dismantle 
national barriers and build supranational institutions 
enabling it to work; we now need sound economic 
governance, a stepping up of structural reforms and 
courageous policy choices. The second force is 
‘economic integration’ encompassing growing trade 
and financial linkages. The third force is ‘monetary 
integration’, a process that began with monetary 
cooperation in the 1960s, progressed through 
exchange rate coordination in the 1970-90s, and was 
completed by the launch of the euro. The outcome of 
EMU is determined by the interaction between these 
complementary forces.  
 
Figure 1. The working of the euro area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this Policy Brief is to flag some 
considerations that seem missing in the current heated 
debate on bail-outs and bail-ins, the size of liquidity 
facilities, and the terms of a crisis resolution 
mechanism. While these mechanisms and schemes 
would be superimposed on the architecture and 
governance of EMU, we ask if part of the solution to 
the euro area crisis may not be found within EMU 
itself. Another consideration is that the three forces 
can have different dynamics. Over the last decades 
political integration has provided the impulses for 
EMU to advance, yet at times it has trailed the other 
forces.
1 On the other hand, economic integration 
advances slowly but steadily: it has been the driving 
                                                      
1 What does this mean? We can answer with two examples. 
Signing the Treaty of Rome was highly visionary and 
proved to be a successful choice for the whole continent. 
Instead, the Stability and Growth Pact may only now 
evolve into a viable and binding governance tool (some 
speak of the “SGP 3.0”). 
force since the late 1950s. Monetary integration and 
the launch of the euro represent instead a switch in 
regime.  
This Policy Brief is organised in three sections. First 
we survey diverse outcomes since the launch of the 
euro. Here we illustrate how the benefits the euro can 
generate depend on the degree of openness, flexibility 
and income correlation among euro area countries: 
these are economic concepts which over time are 
affected by policies. In the second section we review 
the main failings and fault lines that brought us to the 
current sovereign crisis. In the third section we 
postulate that to exit the crisis we need to unravel the 
factors behind each fault line. We argue in this brief 
that the achievements of EMU are to some extent 
interlinked with the crisis. We stress the need for 
explaining what EMU can and cannot do and the 
rationale for its unique governance. As the situation is 
still evolving, we only offer some final observations. 
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1.  What economic and financial effects 
has the euro had? 
The euro area today is not the one that was imagined 
when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, or even when 
the euro was launched.  
The euro is contributing to the transformation of 
euro area economies. From a strictly monetary 
policy perspective, these years may well have been as 
good as many had hoped (see Mongelli & Wyplosz, 
2009). Inflation was low and inflationary expectations 
remained well anchored, even throughout the crisis. 
Interest rates were also low at all maturities for all 
countries (which, as we discuss later, contributed to 
the fault lines) until the intensification of the global 
financial crisis. The crisis could have had even worse 
effects were it not for the prompt action of the ECB, 
as well as other central banks, that shored up the 
financial system.  
Financial institutions and companies now have a 
greater continental perspective and reach. Households 
increasingly hold assets from each partner country 
and consume each others’ goods and services. For 
example, since 1998, trade among euro area countries 
has risen strongly. The most comprehensive study to 
date (Baldwin et al., 2008) concludes that the euro has 
probably increased intra-euro area trade by some 5% 
– a significant outcome considering that trade among 
European countries had already risen uninterrupted 
for over five decades. Over the same period, services 
trade also went up, rising from 5% to 7% of GDP. 
Hence, internal openness grew significantly (while 
extra-euro area trade grew even further). The financial 
crisis has temporarily dented trade.  
The euro has also had a significant impact on several 
segments of the European financial markets (see ECB, 
2008 and Buti et al., 2010). Money markets integrated 
after the introduction of the euro. In bond and equity 
markets a process of structural change and increasing 
integration is unfolding due e.g. to the removal of 
currency-matching restrictions. Since the launch of 
the euro, the euro area seems to have been a magnet 
for foreign direct investment (FDI) activities 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, while an 
increasing share of FDI flows is taking place between 
euro area countries. Between 2000 and 2005, the euro 
area countries accounted for as much as 57% of world 
FDI inflows. Integration of financial institutions and 
exchanges has instead proceeded more slowly.  
We also saw a sharp decline in the ‘home bias’. 
International ownership of public debt of euro area 
countries has risen from 32.5% in 1999, to 53.5% in 
2009. In some ways, the contagion effect following 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis testifies to such deeper 
financial integration. In fact, there are now substantial 
holdings of Greek and Irish bonds, as well as those of 
other countries, elsewhere in Europe. They were 
channelled through the financial system, which also 
built substantial cross-countries exposure. This is 
normal in a monetary union and leads to increasing 
efficiencies and fosters risk-sharing.  
Observation 1. Such deeper economic and financial 
integration comes as no surprise: it had long been 
postulated by Frankel & Rose (1998) as the 
“endogeneity of the optimum currency area”, which 
may require up to 30 years to fully materialise (see De 
Grauwe & Mongelli, 2005). These benign effects 
cannot be overemphasised: they represent the intrinsic 
value of the euro area and serve as a shared asset. 
This should provide the motivation and support for 
completing the transformation of the euro area.  
Yet, greater integration also comes with greater 
spillover effects across euro area countries. More 
recently, these achievements have provided the 
ground for the transmission of the sovereign crisis 
from country-to-country: e.g. through financial 
exposures, trade linkages and cross-country asset 
ownerships. Thus, paradoxically, the proof that euro 
area countries have become more interconnected lies 
in the contagion from the Greek sovereign crisis. Yet, 
as we shall see, the solution lays not in severing these 
ties.  
How about structural reforms? This debate matters 
due to the impact on flexibility and adaptability of 
euro area economies.  Duval & Elmeskov (2006) 
observe that on average, the intensity of structural 
reforms between 1994 and 2004 was greater in the 
euro area than in the rest of the OECD countries, and 
that reforms have also been typically deeper and more 
comprehensive in the euro area. Thereafter, Germany 
undertook the Hartz IV reforms, while Italy and Spain 
relied more on a dual labour market (raising social 
inequality). The relevant question now is: have 
product and labour markets changed enough?  
Observation 2. Despite these efforts, several euro 
area countries still have a substantial ‘structural 
reform gap’ that predates the launch of the euro. In 
some countries this gap has actually widened after the 
launch of the euro due, amongst others, to more direct 
cross-country competition. Moreover, all euro area 
countries are now exposed to a fiercely competitive 
global economic and financial environment (see Catte 
et al., 2010). A country like Italy can no longer rely 
on competitive devaluations. Instead, domestic 
structural reforms are needed to support economic 
governance and help to steer national competitiveness 
vis-à-vis the main partner countries. Accordingly, the 
benchmark for structural reforms has actually 
increased with EMU.  
A useful diagramme.  Is there a way to represent 
these developments? Yes, by referring to the optimum 
currency area (OCA) theory. At its most basic level, 4 | Francesco Paolo Mongelli 
the OCA theory is about openness, flexibility and 
correlation. Members of an OCA need to be:  
•  ‘Open’ vis-à-vis each other in terms of trade and 
financial integration. This reduces the usefulness 
of national exchange rates, spurs competition and 
improves the allocation of resources across the 
area and fosters growth.  
•  ‘Flexible’ in terms of price and wage flexibility, 
but also the mobility of capital and labour (both 
occupational and geographical). Flexibility 
enhances efficiency and also facilitates the 
adjustment following a shock.  
•  ‘Highly correlated’ with each other. This implies 
the absence of persistent and irremediable 
divergence over the medium to long term. 
Correlation is promoted by low and similar 
inflation rates, highly diversified production and 
consumption diluting the possible impact of 
country-specific shocks, and broad similarity of 
policy preferences. Financial integration helps 
smooth asymmetric shocks and spurs correlation 
as does fiscal discipline. 
While openness, flexibility and correlation will define 
the success of the euro area, the motivation for 
launching the euro lies in the net benefits it can 
bring. Monetary unions are meant to be welfare 
enhancing. Euro area countries expect to gain from 
improvements in microeconomic efficiency, such as 
from deeper trade and financial integration that boosts 
growth; from improvements in macroeconomic 
stability, such as from low current and expected 
inflation and interest rates, and increasing risk-
sharing; and from the international role of the euro. 
Moreover, higher openness and flexibility reduce the 
costs from losing direct control over the exchange rate 
(for a detailed analysis, see Mongelli, 2010a).  
Figure 2 plots various combinations of openness and 
income correlation. For points on the right and above 
the ‘OCA line’ the benefits from the euro prevail. The 
‘higher’ the openness and correlation, the higher the 
advantages of sharing the euro. An increase in 
flexibility shifts the OCA line downwards, raising the 
benefits from the euro. The achievements of the 
euro’s first decade are captured by the shift from point 
2 to point 3 and an increase in benefits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How about the single monetary policy? Higher 
openness, flexibility and income correlation spur 
further economic convergence and ease the 
implementation – and effectiveness – of the single 
monetary policy in the euro area. This in turn 
enhances the benefits from the euro.  
Observation 3. Is that all? Not quite. There is in 
fact another dimension that over time pervades, and 
partly drives all others: members of an OCA also need 
to share a strong political will to make the monetary 
union succeed (Mintz, 1970). This implies a resolve to 
make the monetary union work, fostering compliance 
with joint commitments, sustaining policy 
coordination and encouraging the building of shared 
institutions through which to channel policies. This 
falls under the umbrella of political integration of 
Figure 1.  
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2.  Failings of economic governance 
Despite the above benign outcomes, the euro area is 
now coping with various fault lines that have been 
building over a long period due to various failings. 
The crisis has exposed and exacerbated them. 
National failings. In some countries, economic 
governance did not fully rise to the challenges of a 
new, and rapidly changing economic and financial 
environment. The depth and implications of this 
change in regime was widely underestimated. 
Benefits, such as easier access to credit as well as 
budget borrowing at lower interest rates than in the 
past, were taken. However, product and labour market 
reforms to further raise flexibility advanced slowly. 
Policy efforts might have been eschewed, some say, 
as a result of the fatigue from fulfilling the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. Yet, there was no lack of 
analysis and pressure from the ECB, the EU 
Commission and others (see ECB, 2008, for an 
analysis of the build-up of the fault lines). Greece 
suffered a sovereign debt crisis after systematic 
misreporting of persistently high deficits. It is now in 
an EU-IMF-ECB programme.  
A failing of supranational monitoring. Prior to the 
crisis, there was uneven enforcement of fiscal 
discipline over time and across countries. On the one 
hand, we saw a clear break with respect to the past: 
while before the launch of the euro fiscal policies 
were largely pro-cyclical over the business cycle; 
after the launch of the euro they became slightly anti-
cyclical or neutral. Moreover the euro area debt-to-
GDP ratio declined from about 72% in 1999 to about 
66% in 2007 (the year the crisis started). On the other 
hand, this reduction was both limited and uneven 
across countries: e.g. in Germany and France the debt 
rose. The preventive arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) didn’t work as hoped for. This is one of 
the fault lines that needs mending. 
Since the launch of the euro, real exchange rates of 
euro area countries – i.e. their relative 
competitiveness – changed quite substantially. In the 
1999 to 2007 period, the harmonised competitiveness 
indicators appreciated by almost 23% in Ireland, 
about 15% in Spain and almost 10% in Portugal and 
Greece, while remaining practically unchanged in 
Germany, Austria and Finland (again see ECB, 2008). 
Changes in average annual unit labour costs also 
portray a similar dispersion: they declined by over 1% 
per year in Germany and Austria and grew by more 
than 1% per year in Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal. Such swings are in part explained by a 
catching up of price levels, and even some real 
exchange rate corrections: according to some, the 
German D-Mark might have been too strong in the 
run-up to the euro. But there was more. A look at 
cumulated changes in current account positions over 
the 1999 to 2007 period reveals a surge of surpluses 
by about 6% in Germany and Austria, and a 
deterioration in current account deficits by about 6% 
or more in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece. This 
is the second fault line.  
What happened? In some countries the gradual build-
up of current account imbalances originated from a 
domestic credit boom that propelled, in particular, the 
construction sector. For example, after 2001-02, 
Ireland started experiencing financial market-driven 
‘exuberance’ that fuelled a boom in real estate. 
Income taxes were lowered and fiscal policies became 
increasingly reliant on tax revenues from building 
companies and the taxation of property sales: i.e. on 
the housing bubble. In the meantime, soaring 
domestic prices and wages led to progressive losses in 
competitiveness. Diverse manufacturing activities 
shrank, and jobs were lost. After the real estate bubble 
burst and the global financial crisis hit, fiscal policies 
became unsustainable.  
How could these fault lines build-up for so long? 
There were weak deterrents. Various EU/euro area 
institutions did not have enough teeth to fully enforce 
the Stability and Growth Pact and push for and 
enforce more changes at national levels. Then, in 
November 2003, the SGP was even weakened at the 
behest of France and Germany. Multilateral 
surveillance failed. Moreover, financial market 
discipline was largely absent until well into the crisis. 
During the first decade of the euro, financial market 
participants and rating agencies did not discriminate 
between national issuers with different standings. In 
other words, bond markets were not vigilant: they did 
not operate as deterrents against excessive deficits 
and/or sustained high public indebtedness (that were 
however apparent). When they changed their 
assessment about sovereign solvency in Greece, 
spreads soared as did premia on credit default swaps 
(CDSs). 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, the world has been struck by a 
full-blown systemic financial crisis, unprecedented 
in size, if measured by financial losses and fiscal 
costs, unprecedented in extent, if measured by its 
geographical reach, and unprecedented in speed and 
synchronisation, if measured by the precipitous fall in 
worldwide economic output. Money markets seized 
up. International trade plummeted, which affected 
euro-area economies disproportionately due to their 
high degree of openness. The construction sector in 
many countries came to a standstill and 
unemployment climbed to levels not seen for decades. 
Budget deficits soared in all euro-area countries due 
to a drop in many sources of revenues, the expense of 
shoring up the economy and the cost of various types 
of support to financial institutions.  6 | Francesco Paolo Mongelli 
There was also an institutional vacuum. When the 
Greek sovereign crisis intensified in late 2009 and 
early 2010, the disruptive potential of financial market 
backlash and threat of rapid contagion had not been 
fully grasped. There was also an institutional vacuum 
that merits some explanations. The governance of 
EMU was designed without a framework to deal with 
a sovereign crisis in the euro area. Why?  As a 
deterrent to underpin the no-bailout rule, there was no 
facility for crisis management and resolution: but we 
found out the hard way that this deterrent didn’t work. 
Instead, a Medium-Term Financial Assistance facility 
is being used by diverse non-euro area EU countries. 
The current policy debate is mostly about how to fill 
this vacuum: i.e., it is about further elements of 
political integration.    
Observation 4. There is no denying the severity of 
the current challenges. Since the fall of 2009, we have 
seen strong fiscal-financial linkages in several euro 
area countries: i.e. sovereign and bank’s CDS spreads 
have been moving jointly. This is reminiscent of the 
emerging economies’ crisis in the past. Moreover, by 
the end of 2010 public indebtedness in the euro area is 
expected to exceed 80% of GDP. Yield differentials 
of several euro area government bonds have grown 
further apart exceeding, in some cases, the levels 
preceding the launch of the euro. In terms of Figure 2, 
this entails a weakening of flexibility and over time 
income correlation. 
A diagramme to illustrate the failings. Figure 3 
below plots the effect that the failings that we just 
discussed might have, if not corrected, in the coming 
years. A sustained decline in correlation ensuing from 
diverging fiscal consolidations and paths toward 
economic recovery may move the euro area from, say, 
point 4 to point 5. While financial integration might 
suffer in the aftermath of the crisis, trade in goods and 
services may instead recover its lost ground: thus 
openness might still continue rising over time. If not, 
then the move might be along the segmented line to 
point 6. Moreover, lack of fiscal adjustments will 
reduce flexibility – thus shifting the OCA Line 
outward. This would further hinder correlation of 
incomes and reduce the benefits from sharing a single 
currency. But it doesn’t need to get to that point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is that all? Again, not quite. Some suspect that 
sharing a single currency would spur country 
specialisation, thus reducing the differentiation in 
manufacturing.  Ceteris paribus income correlation 
would decline and the risk of asymmetric shocks 
would rise: this is the so-called ‘Krugman 
concentration hypothesis’. Yet, these developments 
may still be compensated by deeper financial 
integration raising ‘risk sharing’. In other words, this 
would be equivalent to a market-based form of cross-
country insurance. Another soothing factor is that 
nowadays the bulk of economic activity and growth 
originates from services (that are very spread out and 
differentiated). These are empirical questions for the 
long-term, yet the answers will need to be considered 
in the future governance of the euro area as well.  
3.  Three lines of defence 
Looking ahead, three lines of defence are jointly 
needed to reduce systemic risks, allow the euro area to 
work efficiently and secure the most benefits from the 
euro in the coming years.  
Figure 3. Failings of economic governance plus the crisis  
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1. Raising the acceptance for domestic reforms and 
for bringing public finances under control. Various 
euro-area countries still have a substantial ‘structural 
reform gap’ because the need for flexibility and 
openness has risen with EMU. To allow the national 
competitiveness channel to work, product and labour 
markets must be freed up. More specifically, what 
should be done? To answer we enter the realm of 
national policies. Each country should formulate 
clearer national fiscal rules, like a domestic SGP, and 
permit an independent national fiscal assessment. 
Transparent domestic reform frameworks are also 
needed. For some countries enforcing reforms and 
securing fiscal discipline will require tough choices 
across generational divides and over time: improving 
education versus pension systems, infrastructures 
versus healthcare, research and development versus 
defence, etc. Strengthening of tax administration and 
treasury systems will also be crucial. Supporting the 
Europe 2020 reform agenda recently put forward by 
the European Commission, as well as National 
Reform Programmes, will be essential (as described in 
Mongelli, 2010b). Thus, each country needs to find its 
own tradeoffs and domestic support from within its 
population.  
These considerations are not new. Yet, due to the 
crisis, they are now cast in a new dramatic light. 
While we had long understood the welfare costs of 
not-reforming, now we know that in a monetary union 
without flexible exchange rates there may be 
substantial risks to fiscal sustainability, but also 
financial stability, if reforms and budget consolidation 
are deferred for too long. Thus the domestic 
incentives to undertake product and labour market 
reforms have grown tremendously due to EMU. The 
speed at which such risks can exacerbate, and even 
become systemic, had not been fully understood. 
Thus, the rationale for the governance of the euro area 
needs to be better explained.  
2. Enforcing tighter macroeconomic surveillance 
and prevention. With growing trade and financial 
integration, events and policy choices in each euro-
area country increasingly affect all others. In other 
words, there are greater spillover effects due to 
growing interconnectedness. This justifies a 
strengthening of mutual surveillance and peer review 
of national developments and economic policies. A 
warning system would identify risks arising from 
sustained budget deficits as well as large and 
protracted swings in competitiveness at an early stage 
(see Marzinotto et al., 2010). Thus the euro area needs 
stronger surveillance and prevention.  
Observation 5. Does this sound familiar? Yes, in 
some ways this is reminiscent of the pegging of the 
nominal exchange rates of the past: it is akin to 
pegging the real exchange rate. But how? The 
monitoring of domestic prices, costs of production, 
wages, unit labour costs, export market shares and 
productivity developments is involved.  
3. Building stronger and credible deterrents. In crisis 
times, unsustainable imbalances in any euro area 
country inevitably build up systemic risks for all: 
through trade, financial and confidence channels. 
Thus sound economic and financial assessments for 
each country – as well as the euro area as a whole – 
are indispensable. This will originate amongst others, 
from the European Commission, the ECB, the 
European Systemic Risk Board (once operational) and 
other institutions and fora. Two main deterrents will 
play a crucial role.  
•  The first deterrent is the corrective arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact that needs 
strengthening. Budgetary targets need to bind. 
More credible sanctions are needed when proper 
enforcement of consolidation programmes fails. 
Fiscal discipline is indispensable to grant some 
flexibility but also to be able to tackle future 
challenges stemming from the ageing of the 
population and from climate change.  
•  We have seen how in times of crisis, financial 
markets and rating agencies can rapidly alter their 
assessment and, in extreme circumstances, even 
expedite a solvency crisis. For financial market-
based discipline – that is the second deterrent – to 
work seamlessly over time, comprehensive data 
and transparent information are indispensable.  
Observation 6. The strengthening of the first line of 
defence has a very high order of magnitude and 
potential. It is inescapable: without it, no other 
advancement will be viable in the long term. It 
requires a leap forward in the national understanding - 
and appreciation - of membership in EMU. Looking 
further ahead, there is no liquidity provision or bail 
out scheme that can match such an effort from within.  
Some concluding observations 
The global financial crisis has been a traumatic event 
in the still-short history of the euro area. It has 
aggravated diverse failings in EMU governance, and 
exacerbated various internal imbalances. The great 
vulnerabilities and forthcoming systemic risks 
entailed by weak public finances and the erosion of 
competitiveness in some countries were not 
comprehended on time. Once the sovereign crisis 
erupted in Greece, the dysfunctional policy debate 
that ensued, and the fractious national responses, were 
also harmful. Euro-area policy-makers, but also the 
vast public, were still in a pre-EMU mindset. 
Understandably, national disaffection rose as did 
scepticism about the euro area. 
Can we identify a common thread behind these 
failings? Yes, that some prerequisites and 8 | Francesco Paolo Mongelli 
implications of EMU are still poorly understood by 
many. Is there a general lesson? Yes, that it is still 
difficult to coordinate the needs and interests of many 
sovereign countries that are sharing a single currency. 
Yet, due to economic and financial integration, that is 
the interconnectedness we were talking about: 
national needs are now more closely linked. We are 
all each others’ stakeholders.  
Observation 7. The imperative challenge is to bring 
back financial stability and confidence. Thus, most 
attention is now devoted to the size of rescue 
packages and the terms and conditions of a permanent 
crisis management and resolution mechanism (and 
correctly so). But there is more: a new governance is 
also within reach. Vigorous policy debate and policy 
actions have been stepped up since the fall of 2008. 
The economic governance of the euro area is being 
overhauled to remedy the various failings and prevent 
fault lines from reoccurring too soon. There are 
various steps forward, some more visible than others, 
including: enforcing tighter macroeconomic 
surveillance and prevention, strengthening the 
Stability and Growth Pact (also referred to as “SGP 
3.0”) by granting some degree of automaticity to the 
corrective arm, and a redesign of macro-prudential 
supervision. Greece agreed upon a three-year 
recovery programme backed by the IMF and the EU 
through a European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). 
Greece is subject to strict conditionality with which it 
is complying. Ireland has followed suit with a 
differently aimed EU-IMF programme. All other 
euro-area countries also announced more ambitious 
financial targets and reform agendas. There is also 
broad consensus that the EFSF may turn into a 
permanent European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM).  
Observation 8. It is fair to observe that the 
governance of the euro area has turned around: yet it 
will take some time to enforce and ascertain this 
transformation. But might this be enough by itself to 
reduce future systemic risks? No, there is a need for 
more clearly explaining what EMU can and cannot 
do, and conveying the rationale for its unique 
governance. As the features of a novel and broadly 
accepted, economic governance of EMU emerge, 
uncertainties will be gradually reduced. This will 
support the growth that is indispensable to heal the 
legacy of the crisis and complete the transformation of 
the euro area. Yet this will require time which in turn 
requires trust. What else? Looking ahead income 
correlation may temporarily decline as a legacy of the 
crisis, but also as a result of the “concentration 
hypothesis” that is reshaping euro area economies. 
There is no reason to worry though: financial based 
risk-sharing will strengthen, and structural reforms 
can enhance flexibility and adaptability. Over time 
this can unleash the growth potential of each euro area 
country.  
Observation 9. All the factors that led to the launch 
of the euro are still valid. All three forces shaping the 
euro area – namely political, economic and monetary 
integration – must be realigned (and convincingly so). 
Yet, perhaps a paradox is that we are again calling for 
renewed political commitment, will and vision (as for 
the founding of the EU and EMU), only that this time 
political efforts must be oriented inwards.  
There is much more to say and various thorny issues 
remain wide open. The euro can provide an outside 
shield and foster internal stability to support this 
transformation while facing several global challenges 
that are ‘too big to handle’ for any euro area country 
alone. What matters the most is that the high intrinsic 
value of EMU is worth all the efforts to make the euro 
area succeed in such a transformation.  
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